[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":483},["ShallowReactive",2],{"article:claude-code-local-agent-security":3},{"meta":4,"raw":18,"references":19,"prev":41,"next":51,"body":60,"toc":472},{"slug":5,"title":6,"date":7,"updated":8,"tags":9,"summary":14,"draft":15,"lang":16,"minutes":17},"claude-code-local-agent-security","Claude Code 本地 Agent 的安全栈：沙盒、权限、规则与分类器","2026-05-19","2026-10-11",[10,11,12,13],"Claude Code","Agent","安全","沙盒","区分提示规则、程序权限与 OS 沙盒，核对 Claude Code 的真实覆盖范围和平台差异；解释凭证掩码、非沙盒组件和可重复的边界验证。",false,"zh-CN",6,"编码 Agent 一旦拥有 shell，就能改文件、安装依赖、调用网络接口。此时风险不仅是“回答错”，还包括误删、提示注入和凭证泄露。安全设计需要知道：**哪些操作受程序检查，哪些受操作系统限制，哪些还在边界外。**\n\n下面按 2026 年 10 月的公开文档说明 Claude Code。功能、默认值和平台实现会变化，应以安装版本及生效设置为准，不能把某条配置当作全平台保证。\n\n## 三种约束不是同一个东西\n\n| 层次 | 谁执行 | 能控制什么 |\n| --- | --- | --- |\n| 项目提示与任务约束 | 模型解释和遵循 | 指引行为，不是强制安全边界 |\n| 工具权限与规则 | Agent 运行程序检查 | 决定允许、拒绝或请求审批 |\n| OS 沙盒 | 操作系统与代理 | 限制受包裹进程可触达的文件与网络 |\n\n**权限规则由程序检查，不能说它们只靠模型自觉。** 但 Bash 命令规则与 OS 级文件边界的覆盖也不同，一条复杂 shell 命令需要考虑子进程、重定向与命令替换。\n\n![安全边界：工具权限、shell 沙盒，以及单独管理的文件工具和插件进程](\u002Fdiagrams\u002Fsecurity-layers.svg)\n\n*图 1 · 这是约束覆盖关系，不是每条命令必然经过相同顺序的四道流水线。*\n\n## 沙盒包裹什么，默认允许什么\n\nClaude Code 的内置沙盒主要约束 shell 命令及其子进程。内置 Read\u002FEdit\u002FWeb 工具走各自权限规则；hooks、MCP 和其他辅助进程可能在 Bash 沙盒之外运行。[官方沙盒文档](https:\u002F\u002Fcode.claude.com\u002Fdocs\u002Fen\u002Fsandboxing)\n\n当前文档描述的默认读范围较广，包含机器上的凭证文件；写范围主要是工作目录和允许路径，受保护路径另有约束。网络通过代理检查允许域，环境变量可能继承秘密。**限制写入不等于防止秘密被读取或外传。**\n\nmacOS 使用 Seatbelt，Linux\u002FWSL2 使用 bubblewrap 等机制；原生 Windows 的支持范围不同。网络工具是否可用取决于代理、协议和平台，不能笼统声称所有 SSH、数据库客户端都能通或都不能通。\n\n文件 `denyRead` 不自动限制内置 Read 工具，网络域策略也不自动限制 WebFetch。需要把整个 Agent 与插件进程一起隔离时，应评估容器、虚拟机或外层运行边界。\n\n## 权限模式和沙盒模式分别看\n\n`default`、`acceptEdits`、`plan`、`auto` 和 `bypassPermissions` 改变权限处置；沙盒是否启用及是否自动允许边界内命令，是另一组配置。`auto` 的分类器也不等于 OS 沙盒，它对操作意图的判断可能误报或漏报。[权限模式文档](https:\u002F\u002Fcode.claude.com\u002Fdocs\u002Fen\u002Fpermission-modes)\n\n例如对推送设置内容级 ask 规则，可让本地验证自动进行而推送仍进入审批。具体匹配语法和优先级以权限文档为准，不能把模型获得的自然语言授权等同于永久修改机器策略。\n\n沙盒失败后的非沙盒重试、`excludedCommands` 和放宽隔离的开关要单独检查。把解释器、容器管理命令排除，可能间接允许执行新写的脚本；例外应按实际可获得能力评估，而非只看命令名字。\n\n## 受保护路径：防止下一轮扩权\n\nAgent 配置、shell 启动文件、Git hooks 和配置会影响未来执行。它们需要专门保护；不同工具、权限模式和版本的保护方式不同，不能统一说“所有路径永远不可写”。\n\n仓库中的规则、依赖 README、网页和工具报告可能带恶意指令。它们是需要阅读的数据，不能成为修改权限、导出密钥或联系外部服务的授权来源。输出扫描有帮助，但不是提示注入已被彻底解决的证明。\n\n## 凭证掩码：能使用不意味着能看见\n\n支持的凭证 mask 用每会话哨兵占位符替代真实值；受控代理在指定目标上替换回真值，以便认证。目标限定、TLS 处理和配置来源共同构成这个机制的信任边界。\n\n![凭证掩码：命令使用哨兵，受控代理只向授权目标注入，失败时拒绝](\u002Fdiagrams\u002Fsentinel-credentials.svg)\n\n*图 2 · 仅说明支持配置下的机制；不能推导出所有文件、平台和认证协议均可掩码。*\n\n当前文档明确：**macOS 凭证文件 mask 会退化为拒绝读取**，Linux\u002FWSL2 才有相应哨兵文件行为。环境变量与文件是不同路径；提取模式没有匹配到秘密时，也要检查是否会跳过掩码。AWS 重签有支持范围和版本条件，不能当作任意签名请求都可用。[凭证配置细节](https:\u002F\u002Fcode.claude.com\u002Fdocs\u002Fen\u002Fsandboxing#protect-credentials)\n\n拒绝读取更简单，但会影响需要认证的工具；掩码增加代理和配置复杂度。无论选择哪种，都尽量使用短期、最小范围的凭证；目标允许使用某个 token 也不代表该 token 在远端只有最小权限。\n\n## 与 Codex 对照：概念相似，配置独立\n\nCodex 同样将沙盒范围与审批策略区分：前者限制操作可触达哪里，后者控制哪些操作需要审批。具体网络和路径行为取决于平台、宿主及配置，不能从 Claude Code 推断 Codex 的默认值。[Codex 官方说明](https:\u002F\u002Flearn.chatgpt.com\u002Fdocs\u002Fagent-approvals-security)\n\n缓存网页搜索降低部分实时来源风险，但缓存内容仍可携带恶意指令；“缓存索引”不是信任认证。对两种工具都应检查真实生效策略，而不是只记住模式名称。\n\n## 用无秘密探针验证边界\n\n使用临时目录、假凭证和可控测试目标验证：工作区内写入成功、禁止路径写入失败；shell 读取与内置 Read 分别验证；允许域、禁止域和直连尝试分别验证；掩码认证与目标不匹配分别验证。不要通过读取真实密钥来证明保护有效。\n\n同样测试沙盒不可用、被排除命令、插件与 hook 的执行位置，以及符号链接是否改变访问范围。记录客户端版本、平台、设置来源和期望结果，升级后重复检查。失败时收紧边界或修配置，不能把每次失败都自动扩大允许范围。\n\n## 落地检查\n\n1. 区分提示、工具规则和 OS 边界，查看生效配置而非仅看仓库文件。\n2. 文件、环境变量和网络分别控制；写保护不代替读保护。\n3. 单独管理 hooks、MCP、LSP 等边界外组件。\n4. 谨慎评估排除命令与非沙盒重试，CI 有明确失败策略。\n5. 使用假数据探针验证平台差异，升级后回归。\n\n## 参考资料\n\n- [Claude Code — Sandboxing](https:\u002F\u002Fcode.claude.com\u002Fdocs\u002Fen\u002Fsandboxing)\n- [Claude Code — Permission modes](https:\u002F\u002Fcode.claude.com\u002Fdocs\u002Fen\u002Fpermission-modes)\n- [Claude Code — Permissions](https:\u002F\u002Fcode.claude.com\u002Fdocs\u002Fen\u002Fpermissions)\n- [Claude Code — Security](https:\u002F\u002Fcode.claude.com\u002Fdocs\u002Fen\u002Fsecurity)\n- [Codex — Agent approvals & security](https:\u002F\u002Flearn.chatgpt.com\u002Fdocs\u002Fagent-approvals-security)",[20,25,29,33,37],{"title":21,"url":22,"type":23,"note":24,"checked":8},"Claude Code — Sandboxing","https:\u002F\u002Fcode.claude.com\u002Fdocs\u002Fen\u002Fsandboxing","官方文档","文件、网络与凭据相关沙盒配置；具体保护范围依模式和版本而定。",{"title":26,"url":27,"type":23,"note":28,"checked":8},"Claude Code — Permission modes","https:\u002F\u002Fcode.claude.com\u002Fdocs\u002Fen\u002Fpermission-modes","权限模式与审批行为；使用场景和执行环境决定适用边界。",{"title":30,"url":31,"type":23,"note":32,"checked":8},"Claude Code — Permissions","https:\u002F\u002Fcode.claude.com\u002Fdocs\u002Fen\u002Fpermissions","工具许可规则的配置与匹配；应验证规则是否按预期生效。",{"title":34,"url":35,"type":23,"note":36,"checked":8},"Claude Code — Security","https:\u002F\u002Fcode.claude.com\u002Fdocs\u002Fen\u002Fsecurity","Claude Code 的安全设计与使用建议；提示注入仍需要多层控制。",{"title":38,"url":39,"type":23,"note":40,"checked":8},"Codex — Agent approvals & security","https:\u002F\u002Flearn.chatgpt.com\u002Fdocs\u002Fagent-approvals-security","Codex 审批与安全边界的官方说明；审批不能代替操作结果验证。",{"slug":42,"title":43,"date":44,"updated":8,"tags":45,"summary":50,"draft":15,"lang":16,"minutes":17},"multi-agent-communication","多 Agent 如何通信：任务书、结构化回传与 A2A 协议","2026-06-16",[11,46,47,48,49],"多智能体","架构","A2A","MCP","从可并行任务出发，设计输入、状态、成果与失败契约；说明共享文件和跨机引用的区别、MCP 与 A2A 的职责，以及协调成本与验收方法。",{"slug":52,"title":53,"date":54,"updated":8,"tags":55,"summary":59,"draft":15,"lang":16,"minutes":17},"context-memory-management","上下文与记忆管理：Agent 的长期记忆怎么建","2026-04-21",[11,56,57,58],"上下文管理","记忆","LLM","区分会话状态、历史压缩与跨会话记忆；用来源、作用域、版本和有效期治理记忆，解释读写流程、遗忘、权限隔离与可验证的评测。",{"type":61,"children":62},"root",[63,77,82,88,175,185,194,203,209,222,232,237,251,256,310,315,328,334,339,344,350,355,363,371,390,395,401,412,417,422,427,432,437,467],{"type":64,"tag":65,"props":66,"children":67},"element","p",{},[68,71],{"type":69,"value":70},"text","编码 Agent 一旦拥有 shell，就能改文件、安装依赖、调用网络接口。此时风险不仅是“回答错”，还包括误删、提示注入和凭证泄露。安全设计需要知道：",{"type":64,"tag":72,"props":73,"children":74},"strong",{},[75],{"type":69,"value":76},"哪些操作受程序检查，哪些受操作系统限制，哪些还在边界外。",{"type":64,"tag":65,"props":78,"children":79},{},[80],{"type":69,"value":81},"下面按 2026 年 10 月的公开文档说明 Claude Code。功能、默认值和平台实现会变化，应以安装版本及生效设置为准，不能把某条配置当作全平台保证。",{"type":64,"tag":83,"props":84,"children":86},"h2",{"id":85},"三种约束不是同一个东西",[87],{"type":69,"value":85},{"type":64,"tag":89,"props":90,"children":91},"table",{},[92,116],{"type":64,"tag":93,"props":94,"children":95},"thead",{},[96],{"type":64,"tag":97,"props":98,"children":99},"tr",{},[100,106,111],{"type":64,"tag":101,"props":102,"children":103},"th",{},[104],{"type":69,"value":105},"层次",{"type":64,"tag":101,"props":107,"children":108},{},[109],{"type":69,"value":110},"谁执行",{"type":64,"tag":101,"props":112,"children":113},{},[114],{"type":69,"value":115},"能控制什么",{"type":64,"tag":117,"props":118,"children":119},"tbody",{},[120,139,157],{"type":64,"tag":97,"props":121,"children":122},{},[123,129,134],{"type":64,"tag":124,"props":125,"children":126},"td",{},[127],{"type":69,"value":128},"项目提示与任务约束",{"type":64,"tag":124,"props":130,"children":131},{},[132],{"type":69,"value":133},"模型解释和遵循",{"type":64,"tag":124,"props":135,"children":136},{},[137],{"type":69,"value":138},"指引行为，不是强制安全边界",{"type":64,"tag":97,"props":140,"children":141},{},[142,147,152],{"type":64,"tag":124,"props":143,"children":144},{},[145],{"type":69,"value":146},"工具权限与规则",{"type":64,"tag":124,"props":148,"children":149},{},[150],{"type":69,"value":151},"Agent 运行程序检查",{"type":64,"tag":124,"props":153,"children":154},{},[155],{"type":69,"value":156},"决定允许、拒绝或请求审批",{"type":64,"tag":97,"props":158,"children":159},{},[160,165,170],{"type":64,"tag":124,"props":161,"children":162},{},[163],{"type":69,"value":164},"OS 沙盒",{"type":64,"tag":124,"props":166,"children":167},{},[168],{"type":69,"value":169},"操作系统与代理",{"type":64,"tag":124,"props":171,"children":172},{},[173],{"type":69,"value":174},"限制受包裹进程可触达的文件与网络",{"type":64,"tag":65,"props":176,"children":177},{},[178,183],{"type":64,"tag":72,"props":179,"children":180},{},[181],{"type":69,"value":182},"权限规则由程序检查，不能说它们只靠模型自觉。",{"type":69,"value":184}," 但 Bash 命令规则与 OS 级文件边界的覆盖也不同，一条复杂 shell 命令需要考虑子进程、重定向与命令替换。",{"type":64,"tag":65,"props":186,"children":187},{},[188],{"type":64,"tag":189,"props":190,"children":193},"img",{"alt":191,"src":192},"安全边界：工具权限、shell 沙盒，以及单独管理的文件工具和插件进程","\u002Fdiagrams\u002Fsecurity-layers.svg",[],{"type":64,"tag":65,"props":195,"children":196},{},[197],{"type":64,"tag":198,"props":199,"children":200},"em",{},[201],{"type":69,"value":202},"图 1 · 这是约束覆盖关系，不是每条命令必然经过相同顺序的四道流水线。",{"type":64,"tag":83,"props":204,"children":206},{"id":205},"沙盒包裹什么默认允许什么",[207],{"type":69,"value":208},"沙盒包裹什么，默认允许什么",{"type":64,"tag":65,"props":210,"children":211},{},[212,214],{"type":69,"value":213},"Claude Code 的内置沙盒主要约束 shell 命令及其子进程。内置 Read\u002FEdit\u002FWeb 工具走各自权限规则；hooks、MCP 和其他辅助进程可能在 Bash 沙盒之外运行。",{"type":64,"tag":215,"props":216,"children":219},"a",{"href":22,"rel":217},[218],"nofollow",[220],{"type":69,"value":221},"官方沙盒文档",{"type":64,"tag":65,"props":223,"children":224},{},[225,227],{"type":69,"value":226},"当前文档描述的默认读范围较广，包含机器上的凭证文件；写范围主要是工作目录和允许路径，受保护路径另有约束。网络通过代理检查允许域，环境变量可能继承秘密。",{"type":64,"tag":72,"props":228,"children":229},{},[230],{"type":69,"value":231},"限制写入不等于防止秘密被读取或外传。",{"type":64,"tag":65,"props":233,"children":234},{},[235],{"type":69,"value":236},"macOS 使用 Seatbelt，Linux\u002FWSL2 使用 bubblewrap 等机制；原生 Windows 的支持范围不同。网络工具是否可用取决于代理、协议和平台，不能笼统声称所有 SSH、数据库客户端都能通或都不能通。",{"type":64,"tag":65,"props":238,"children":239},{},[240,242,249],{"type":69,"value":241},"文件 ",{"type":64,"tag":243,"props":244,"children":246},"code",{"className":245},[],[247],{"type":69,"value":248},"denyRead",{"type":69,"value":250}," 不自动限制内置 Read 工具，网络域策略也不自动限制 WebFetch。需要把整个 Agent 与插件进程一起隔离时，应评估容器、虚拟机或外层运行边界。",{"type":64,"tag":83,"props":252,"children":254},{"id":253},"权限模式和沙盒模式分别看",[255],{"type":69,"value":253},{"type":64,"tag":65,"props":257,"children":258},{},[259,265,267,273,274,280,281,287,289,295,297,302,304],{"type":64,"tag":243,"props":260,"children":262},{"className":261},[],[263],{"type":69,"value":264},"default",{"type":69,"value":266},"、",{"type":64,"tag":243,"props":268,"children":270},{"className":269},[],[271],{"type":69,"value":272},"acceptEdits",{"type":69,"value":266},{"type":64,"tag":243,"props":275,"children":277},{"className":276},[],[278],{"type":69,"value":279},"plan",{"type":69,"value":266},{"type":64,"tag":243,"props":282,"children":284},{"className":283},[],[285],{"type":69,"value":286},"auto",{"type":69,"value":288}," 和 ",{"type":64,"tag":243,"props":290,"children":292},{"className":291},[],[293],{"type":69,"value":294},"bypassPermissions",{"type":69,"value":296}," 改变权限处置；沙盒是否启用及是否自动允许边界内命令，是另一组配置。",{"type":64,"tag":243,"props":298,"children":300},{"className":299},[],[301],{"type":69,"value":286},{"type":69,"value":303}," 的分类器也不等于 OS 沙盒，它对操作意图的判断可能误报或漏报。",{"type":64,"tag":215,"props":305,"children":307},{"href":27,"rel":306},[218],[308],{"type":69,"value":309},"权限模式文档",{"type":64,"tag":65,"props":311,"children":312},{},[313],{"type":69,"value":314},"例如对推送设置内容级 ask 规则，可让本地验证自动进行而推送仍进入审批。具体匹配语法和优先级以权限文档为准，不能把模型获得的自然语言授权等同于永久修改机器策略。",{"type":64,"tag":65,"props":316,"children":317},{},[318,320,326],{"type":69,"value":319},"沙盒失败后的非沙盒重试、",{"type":64,"tag":243,"props":321,"children":323},{"className":322},[],[324],{"type":69,"value":325},"excludedCommands",{"type":69,"value":327}," 和放宽隔离的开关要单独检查。把解释器、容器管理命令排除，可能间接允许执行新写的脚本；例外应按实际可获得能力评估，而非只看命令名字。",{"type":64,"tag":83,"props":329,"children":331},{"id":330},"受保护路径防止下一轮扩权",[332],{"type":69,"value":333},"受保护路径：防止下一轮扩权",{"type":64,"tag":65,"props":335,"children":336},{},[337],{"type":69,"value":338},"Agent 配置、shell 启动文件、Git hooks 和配置会影响未来执行。它们需要专门保护；不同工具、权限模式和版本的保护方式不同，不能统一说“所有路径永远不可写”。",{"type":64,"tag":65,"props":340,"children":341},{},[342],{"type":69,"value":343},"仓库中的规则、依赖 README、网页和工具报告可能带恶意指令。它们是需要阅读的数据，不能成为修改权限、导出密钥或联系外部服务的授权来源。输出扫描有帮助，但不是提示注入已被彻底解决的证明。",{"type":64,"tag":83,"props":345,"children":347},{"id":346},"凭证掩码能使用不意味着能看见",[348],{"type":69,"value":349},"凭证掩码：能使用不意味着能看见",{"type":64,"tag":65,"props":351,"children":352},{},[353],{"type":69,"value":354},"支持的凭证 mask 用每会话哨兵占位符替代真实值；受控代理在指定目标上替换回真值，以便认证。目标限定、TLS 处理和配置来源共同构成这个机制的信任边界。",{"type":64,"tag":65,"props":356,"children":357},{},[358],{"type":64,"tag":189,"props":359,"children":362},{"alt":360,"src":361},"凭证掩码：命令使用哨兵，受控代理只向授权目标注入，失败时拒绝","\u002Fdiagrams\u002Fsentinel-credentials.svg",[],{"type":64,"tag":65,"props":364,"children":365},{},[366],{"type":64,"tag":198,"props":367,"children":368},{},[369],{"type":69,"value":370},"图 2 · 仅说明支持配置下的机制；不能推导出所有文件、平台和认证协议均可掩码。",{"type":64,"tag":65,"props":372,"children":373},{},[374,376,381,383],{"type":69,"value":375},"当前文档明确：",{"type":64,"tag":72,"props":377,"children":378},{},[379],{"type":69,"value":380},"macOS 凭证文件 mask 会退化为拒绝读取",{"type":69,"value":382},"，Linux\u002FWSL2 才有相应哨兵文件行为。环境变量与文件是不同路径；提取模式没有匹配到秘密时，也要检查是否会跳过掩码。AWS 重签有支持范围和版本条件，不能当作任意签名请求都可用。",{"type":64,"tag":215,"props":384,"children":387},{"href":385,"rel":386},"https:\u002F\u002Fcode.claude.com\u002Fdocs\u002Fen\u002Fsandboxing#protect-credentials",[218],[388],{"type":69,"value":389},"凭证配置细节",{"type":64,"tag":65,"props":391,"children":392},{},[393],{"type":69,"value":394},"拒绝读取更简单，但会影响需要认证的工具；掩码增加代理和配置复杂度。无论选择哪种，都尽量使用短期、最小范围的凭证；目标允许使用某个 token 也不代表该 token 在远端只有最小权限。",{"type":64,"tag":83,"props":396,"children":398},{"id":397},"与-codex-对照概念相似配置独立",[399],{"type":69,"value":400},"与 Codex 对照：概念相似，配置独立",{"type":64,"tag":65,"props":402,"children":403},{},[404,406],{"type":69,"value":405},"Codex 同样将沙盒范围与审批策略区分：前者限制操作可触达哪里，后者控制哪些操作需要审批。具体网络和路径行为取决于平台、宿主及配置，不能从 Claude Code 推断 Codex 的默认值。",{"type":64,"tag":215,"props":407,"children":409},{"href":39,"rel":408},[218],[410],{"type":69,"value":411},"Codex 官方说明",{"type":64,"tag":65,"props":413,"children":414},{},[415],{"type":69,"value":416},"缓存网页搜索降低部分实时来源风险，但缓存内容仍可携带恶意指令；“缓存索引”不是信任认证。对两种工具都应检查真实生效策略，而不是只记住模式名称。",{"type":64,"tag":83,"props":418,"children":420},{"id":419},"用无秘密探针验证边界",[421],{"type":69,"value":419},{"type":64,"tag":65,"props":423,"children":424},{},[425],{"type":69,"value":426},"使用临时目录、假凭证和可控测试目标验证：工作区内写入成功、禁止路径写入失败；shell 读取与内置 Read 分别验证；允许域、禁止域和直连尝试分别验证；掩码认证与目标不匹配分别验证。不要通过读取真实密钥来证明保护有效。",{"type":64,"tag":65,"props":428,"children":429},{},[430],{"type":69,"value":431},"同样测试沙盒不可用、被排除命令、插件与 hook 的执行位置，以及符号链接是否改变访问范围。记录客户端版本、平台、设置来源和期望结果，升级后重复检查。失败时收紧边界或修配置，不能把每次失败都自动扩大允许范围。",{"type":64,"tag":83,"props":433,"children":435},{"id":434},"落地检查",[436],{"type":69,"value":434},{"type":64,"tag":438,"props":439,"children":440},"ol",{},[441,447,452,457,462],{"type":64,"tag":442,"props":443,"children":444},"li",{},[445],{"type":69,"value":446},"区分提示、工具规则和 OS 边界，查看生效配置而非仅看仓库文件。",{"type":64,"tag":442,"props":448,"children":449},{},[450],{"type":69,"value":451},"文件、环境变量和网络分别控制；写保护不代替读保护。",{"type":64,"tag":442,"props":453,"children":454},{},[455],{"type":69,"value":456},"单独管理 hooks、MCP、LSP 等边界外组件。",{"type":64,"tag":442,"props":458,"children":459},{},[460],{"type":69,"value":461},"谨慎评估排除命令与非沙盒重试，CI 有明确失败策略。",{"type":64,"tag":442,"props":463,"children":464},{},[465],{"type":69,"value":466},"使用假数据探针验证平台差异，升级后回归。",{"type":64,"tag":83,"props":468,"children":470},{"id":469},"参考资料",[471],{"type":69,"value":469},[473,475,476,477,478,479,480,481,482],{"id":85,"depth":474,"text":85},2,{"id":205,"depth":474,"text":208},{"id":253,"depth":474,"text":253},{"id":330,"depth":474,"text":333},{"id":346,"depth":474,"text":349},{"id":397,"depth":474,"text":400},{"id":419,"depth":474,"text":419},{"id":434,"depth":474,"text":434},{"id":469,"depth":474,"text":469},1792400815607]